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“STRENGTHEN THE THINGS THAT REMAIN:”1
THE SANIST WILL
The construction and meaning of “mental capacity” within the
constitutional arena of Mental Disability Law has been more strictly
scrutinized by courts and scholars than the construction and mean-
ing of mental capacity in the area of wills.  One’s autonomy in life
has naturally been seen as more important than one’s autonomy
after death.  Sanism seems more severe when dealing with an indi-
vidual’s liberty and less traumatic when dealing with the individ-
ual’s right to dispose of property.2  Sanism, therefore, is seen as
more detrimental to the former.  But in this society, we value our
property almost as much as we value our liberty.3  In essence, it is
our liberty and independence that are at stake when our voiceless
wishes contained in a will are disregarded on the assumption of
diminished capacity.  Thus, the goal is to combat sanism and
pretextuality4 by raising the bar in civil probate hearings; specifi-
1. BOB DYLAN, When You Gonna Wake Up?, on SLOW TRAIN COMING (Columbia
1979).
2. Michael Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw:”  The Impact of the ADA on the Insti-
tutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 226-227
(2000):
Simply put, “sanism” is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and char-
acter as other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevail-
ing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry.  It
infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.  Sanism is
largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.  It is based predominantly
upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization, and is sus-
tained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common sense”
(“OCS”) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both
in everyday life and in the legal process.
3. Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home is His Castle?:”  Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY
J. OF WOMEN & L. 175, 198 (2002) (“Ultimately, the home would come to embody not
only the sanctity of private property, but also a ‘unique combination of values’ ex-
pressed in the exercise of protected individual liberties in marriage and marital rela-
tions, family and childbearing, and education and school.”).
4. See Perlin, supra note 2:
“Pretextuality” means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently mere-
tricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert wit-
nesses, show a “high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in
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cally raising the bar to a stricter standard of scrutinizing the mental
capacity of the aged or disabled.  We must realize how discreetly
and easily sanism can seep into every area of law.
If the atmosphere of a will probate hearing is anything like a
civil commitment hearing, sanism runs wild.  Both hearings are sus-
ceptible to the misuse of experts in order to manipulate autonomy
in the name of paternalism.5  Usually when a will is contested, the
testifying physician or psychiatrist will never have personally met
the testator.6  He or she will base their testimony as to the testator’s
capacity solely on the testator’s medical records.7   The same occurs
in civil commitment hearings.  Although the testifying individual
may have briefly encountered the patient or know of his or her
medical or psychological history, they themselves may not have di-
agnosed or treated the patient.  If the testifying psychiatrist relies
mainly on records written by colleagues or members of prior insti-
tutions, the patient is subject to the extremes of pretextuality. Oft-
entimes, the treating psychiatrist is not present at the hearing and a
hospital administrator testifies on his or her behalf.8  The future of
the patient is determined without the testimony of the treating psy-
chiatrist and without the ability to effectively cross-examine the tes-
tifying individual who is without sufficient knowledge of the
patient’s status.
order to achieve desired ends.”  This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all
participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the
law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase´ judging,
and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. Id. at 227 (internal cita-
tion omitted).
5. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 68
(2000). (“[E]xpert witnesses in civil commitment cases often impose their own self-
referential concept of ‘morality’ to ensure that patients who ‘really need treatment’
remain institutionalized.”);  Dobie v. Armstrong, 50 N.Y.S. 801, 806 (1898).  (On the
issue of testamentary capacity Justice Follett commented, “The experience of the courts
has demonstrated that the answers of experts, though honestly given, to hypothetical
questions embracing pages of assumed and isolated facts covering a long lifetime, about
which facts the experts have no personal knowledge, are the weakest and most unrelia-
ble kind of evidence in respect to the sanity or insanity of the person inquired about.”).
6. Lawrence A. Frolik, Science, Common Sense, and the Determination of Mental Capac-
ity, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 41, 47 (1999).
7. Id.
8. Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment:  Assessing the Competence of Mental Patients to
Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 393 (1995).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-3-4\NLR405.txt unknown Seq: 3 13-MAR-03 16:51
2002-2003] “STRENGTHEN THE THINGS THAT REMAIN” 567
In both areas of law, it is important to look deeper than what is
written on paper.  We need to find a better way to merge our objec-
tive observances with the individual’s actual subjective intent and
needs.  In these instances, courts need to probe the validity of a
diagnosis as to competency and testamentary capacity.  In both will
contests and guardianship hearings, “the ultimate obligation of the
fact finder is to assess an individual’s mental capacity.”9   The kind
of evidence available is affected by whether the person is alive or
dead,10 but that evidence needs to be viewed through non-sanist
eyes.
Pamela Champine has stated in her assessment of the sanist
will that the test alone for capacity in probate hearings is non-
sanist.11  But is the test rigorous enough to prevent sanism when it
is implemented?  To create a valid will, the testator must (a) know
the nature and extent of his property, (b) know the natural objects
of his bounty, (c) know how the proposed will disposes of his prop-
erty, and (d) have the ability to make a rational plan to dispose of
his property.12   This basic criteria can be compared with the crite-
ria to determine whether a mentally disabled defendant is able to
stand trial.  The test for incompetency to stand trial was formulated
in 1960, in the decision of Dusky v. United States:
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that ‘the
defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some
recollection of events,’ but that the test must be whether
he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.13
Although Dusky established the competency test only for federal
cases, several circuits and state supreme courts have also adopted it as
setting out minimal constitutional standards.14  The criteria for deter-
9. Frolik, supra note 6, at 45.
10. Id.
11. See Pamela Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547 (2003).
12. Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 29 (1862).
13. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
14. Claudine Walker Ausness, Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Sep-
arating Those Unfit for Adversary Combat from Those Who Are Fit, 66 KY. L.J. 666, 673 n.35
(1978).
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mining whether a mentally disabled individual is able to stand trial
seems sufficient on its face, but the questions do not thoroughly ad-
dress the individual’s competency to stand trial.  Whether or not the
defendant is functionally competent is not truly evaluated.  Procedural
questions such as reciting the roles of various individuals within the
court system do not properly and thoroughly address an individual’s
mental capacity.15  Unfortunately, mental disability can be disguised
and mask the defendant’s illness undermining a fair and effective trial.
Similarly,  the test for determining a testator’s capacity when creat-
ing a will needs to be more complex so that subjective intent can be
accurately determined.  Oftentimes an aged testator is unable to recite
or recall details.  He or she also may be unable to express their desires
in a way which we deem acceptable but this does not mean that their
wishes are any less valid.  These assumptions create another branch of
sanism which can be properly labeled “ageism.”16  Ageism is the belief
that the mental deterioration from age renders the elderly completely
incompetent in all areas of their life.  Out of a false sense of necessity,
their wishes are transformed into our wishes or what we subjectively
feel they would want.  Too often we practice sympathy without empa-
thy.  The object of sympathy is the other person’s well-being; the object
of empathy is understanding.  I see the former as looking on the
outside and the latter as looking on the inside.  It is important to incor-
porate both; the outside view to protect well-being, and the inside view
to protect true intent.
In order to protect well-being, the testator and their loved ones
must be shielded from irrational episodes and undue influence.  While
the court’s paternalistic role is necessary, it must be equipped with
open eyes to view sanism.  The undue influence doctrine allows the
judge or jury to impose its own norms on the testator’s dispositive
plans.17  One  specific example of sanism in a paternalistic setting is
15. See Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment and Sexual Predators:  Competence and
Condemnation, 4 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 323, 355-59 (1998).  Legal mental illness is distin-
guished from incompetence. Competence for criminal proceedings is established by
mere visual observations and social control. The purpose of a  competence hearing is
not to establish one’s mental disability but to determine whether or not they can exist
on an equal playing ground within the criminal justice system.
16. Suzanne Meeks, Age Bias in the Decision-Making Behavior of Clinicians, 21 PROF.
PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 279 (1990).
17. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestancy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1,
70  (2000):
Any aspect of probate law that injects judicial discretion into the distribu-
tion of a decedent’s property may create problems for persons whose be-
havior and family structure do not fit the prevailing social norms. Undue
influence is notorious as a tool used to undo a will that does not meet soci-
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seen in the case of Parham v. J.R. .18  When discussing the involuntary
commitment of minors,  Chief Justice Burger said that the “natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their chil-
dren.”19  This can be analogized to the same myth in probate court
that children will always act in the best interests of their parents or
relatives will act in the best interests of relatives when it comes to the
wishes of the aged testator. Paternalism is an important element to law
and society but from our highest to our lowest courts, it is not exempt
from sanism.
As Michael Perlin has stated repeatedly throughout his writings,
sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.20  A masked
sanism which extends to economic status and social status has been
overlooked in both the law of wills and the law of mental health.21
Someone of high social status with greater economic resources has a
much better chance of probating a will even though the will has eccen-
tricities or leaves out close relatives.  Sanism in how we view people’s
economic status in society will draw a fine line between being eccentric
and being mentally ill or incompetent.  For example, Seward Johnson
of Johnson & Johnson left a massive portion of his estate to a woman
more than half his age who had captured his heart and possibly his
mind.22  Seward was able to hire a full-time lawyer whose sole duty for
ety’s approved distributive pattern. If a testator makes testamentary disposi-
tions to persons outside the societal definition of the ‘natural objects of
testator’s bounty,’ disinherited blood relatives may charge that those per-
sons unduly influenced the testator. In some cases, courts appear to find
undue influence based on disapproval of the relationship between the tes-
tator and the beneficiary. Id. at 69-70.
18. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
19. Id. at 602.; See Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice
of Social Facts: Parham as An Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 647- 60 (1983 - 84); see also
Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical Dilemma:  Assessing a Child’s Capacity to Choose, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1873 (1996) (“Unfortunately, much current judicial reasoning with
regard to child development too frequently relies on folk tales or the judge’s personal
experiences, rather than on more verifiable theory.  Such decision making constitutes
unethical judicial practice.” Id. at 1906).
20. Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institutional Mental
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535 (2003).
21. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons:  Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemp-
tion?, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 80 (1995). ( “It is also not coincidental that the majority
of those subjected to involuntary civil commitment are poor, elderly, uneducated, or
female.  They are the people society renders the most visible within the community, and
they are virtually invisible when expelled from the community.” Id. at 87.).
22. DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON &
JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993).  Seward Johnson’s allotment to the young woman increased
significantly over the years while his family’s inheritance markedly decreased. The will
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numerous years was to protect his estate from scorned family mem-
bers.  If Michael Perlin were to leave the bulk of his estate to the Bob
Dylan fan club, he would have a better chance of having his will admit-
ted to probate than would a person with a record of mental illness
and/or commitment to a mental hospital.23  The notion would be that
he is an intellectual, an eccentric, or someone simply  preoccupied
with a musical hobby rather than mentally ill or incompetent.  Money
and social status certainly has not proven to make us any saner but with
such assets we would be less likely to fall under the umbrella of pater-
nalism because through the sanist eye we are seen as more capable.
A final point that must be addressed is the availability of living
wills and trusts. Fortunately, in the law of wills there are options to
avoid probate and escape the test of testamentary capacity.  In some
states one such option is ante-mortem probate, also known as living
probate.  This long-debated probate reform allows the testator to per-
sonally defend his or her disbursement of property.  The principal ad-
vantage of ante-mortem probate is that it allows the court to evaluate
the will based on evidence supplied by the actual author, the testator.
The testator is given the opportunity to explain to the fact-finder his or
her estate plan and personally address any objections on the basis of
undue influence or incapacity.24  Another option is to set up a revoca-
ble trust during one’s lifetime.  Here, the testator can have his or her
wishes carried out without threat of a testamentary capacity debate in
probate.25  Unfortunately those mentally disabled at birth or those
who become ill through an unexpected or sudden onset in later life
may not have the resources or sufficient time to create a trust.  But
was contested on the grounds that the young woman exerted undue influence over Mr.
Johnson and that Johnson lacked the capacity to make a will.
23. Michael Perlin, in many of his publications,  has captured the essence of issues
and problems which plague mental disability law by referring to the lyrics of Bob Dylan.
Examples include:  Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing
Up His Medicine:”  Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
339 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth:”  Sanism, Pretextuality,
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3
(1999); Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna Work on Maggie’s Farm No More:”  Institutional
Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 53 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour:”  Sex, Drugs, the
ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947 (1997); Michael L. Perlin,
“There’s No Success like Failure/and Failure’s No Success at All:”  Exposing the Pretextuality of
Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998).
24. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate:  The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 63, 66 (1978).
25. Mark R. Siegel, Unduly Influenced Trust Revocations, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 241, 243
(2002).
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those of us who may fall victim to ageism have options during our lucid
years to safeguard our wishes, property and loved ones.
In conclusion, I will follow Michael Perlin’s example and incorpo-
rate the lyrics of Bob Dylan in hopes of touching upon the importance
of this topic:
You can’t take it with you and you know that it’s too
worthless to be sold,
They tell you, “Time is money,” as if your life was worth its
weight in gold.
When you gonna wake up, when you gonna wake up
When you gonna wake up and strengthen the things that
remain?26
As lawyers and advocates we must continuously strive to thor-
oughly investigate the actual state and desires of our clients so that
when their sanity and life seem to fade we are able to strengthen the
things that remain.
Heather S. Ellis
26. DYLAN, supra note 1.
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